How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure internet voting with code sheets
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
CodeVoting protection against automatic vote manipulation in an uncontrolled environment
VOTE-ID'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on E-voting and identity
Kleptographic attacks on e-voting schemes
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
An efficient and highly sound voter verification technique and its implementation
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Code voting is a technique used to address the secure platform problem of remote voting. A code voting system consists in secretly sending, e.g. by mail, code sheets to voters that map their choices to entry codes in their ballot. While voting, the voter uses the code sheet to know what code to enter in order to vote for a particular candidate. In effect, the voter does the vote encryption and, since no malicious software on the PC has access to the code sheet it is not able to change the voter's intention. However, without compromising the voter's privacy, the vote codes are not enough to prove that the vote is recorded and counted as cast by the election server. We present a voter verifiable code voting solution which, without revealing the voter's vote, allows the voter to verify, at the end of the election, that her vote was cast and counted as intended by just performing the match of a few small strings. Moreover, w.r.t. a general code voting system, our solution comes with only a minor change in the voting interaction.