Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system

  • Authors:
  • Filip Zagórski;Richard T. Carback;David Chaum;Jeremy Clark;Aleksander Essex;Poorvi L. Vora

  • Affiliations:
  • Wrocław University of Technology, Poland;Draper Laboratory;Voting System Institute;Carleton University, Canada;Western University, Canada;The George Washington University

  • Venue:
  • ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software, or a corrupt election authority--two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.