No attack necessary: the surprising dynamics of SSL trust relationships
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Internet users today depend daily on HTTPS for secure communication with sites they intend to visit. Over the years, many attacks on HTTPS and the certificate trust model it uses have been hypothesized, executed, and/or evolved. Meanwhile the number of browser-trusted (and thus, de facto, user-trusted) certificate authorities has proliferated, while the due diligence in baseline certificate issuance has declined. We survey and categorize prominent security issues with HTTPS and provide a systematic treatment of the history and on-going challenges, intending to provide context for future directions. We also provide a comparative evaluation of current proposals for enhancing the certificate infrastructure used in practice.