A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
Private coins versus public coins in interactive proof systems
STOC '86 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Trading group theory for randomness
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Two Practical and Provably Secure Block Ciphers: BEARS and LION
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Estimation of entropy and mutual information
Neural Computation
On the (In)security of the Fiat-Shamir Paradigm
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
New client puzzle outsourcing techniques for DoS resistance
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A model and architecture for pseudo-random generation with applications to /dev/random
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Harvesting verifiable challenges from oblivious online sources
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cryptography from Sunspots: How to Use an Imperfect Reference String
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Extractors for binary elliptic curves
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
In defense of pseudorandom sample selection
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Efficient non-interactive proof systems for bilinear groups
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On the security of election audits with low entropy randomness
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
A verifiable random function with short proofs and keys
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
How to turn loaded dice into fair coins
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single layer optical-scan voting with fully distributed trust
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Scalable byzantine agreement with a random beacon
SSS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In standard voting procedures, random audits are one method for increasing election integrity. In the case of cryptographic (or end-to-end) election verification, random challenges are often used to establish that the tally was computed correctly. In both cases, a source of randomness is required. In two recent binding cryptographic elections, this randomness was drawn from stock market data. This approach allows anyone with access to financial data to verify the challenges were generated correctly and, assuming market fluctuations are unpredictable to some degree, the challenges were generated at the correct time. However the degree to which these fluctuations are unpredictable is not known to be sufficient for generating a fair and unpredictable challenge. In this paper, we use tools from computational finance to provide an estimate of the amount of entropy in the closing price of a stock. We estimate that for each of the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones industrial average, the entropy is between 6 and 9 bits per trading day. We then propose a straight-forward protocol for regularly publishing verifiable 128-bit random seeds with entropy harvested over time from stock prices. These "beacons" can be used as challenges directly, or as a seed to a deterministic pseudorandom generator for creating larger challenges.