The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
The art of computer programming, volume 2 (3rd ed.): seminumerical algorithms
On estimating the size and confidence of a statistical audit
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
In defense of pseudorandom sample selection
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
On the use of financial data as a random beacon
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Computational complexity and information asymmetry in election audits with low-entropy randomness
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using convex optimization
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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Secure election audits require some method of randomly selecting the units to be audited. Because physical methods such as dice rolling or lottery-style ping pong ball selection are inefficient when a large number of audit units must be selected, some authors have proposed to stretch physical methods by using them to seed randomness tables or random number generators. We analyze the security of these methods when the amount of input entropy is low under the assumption that the attacker can choose the audit units to attack. Our results indicate that under these conditions audits do not necessarily provide the detection probability implied by the standard statistics. This effect is most pronounced for randomness tables, where significantly more units must be audited in order to achieve the detection probability that would be expected if the audit units were selected by a truly random process. It is still unclear whether there are practical methods for safely using such tables for this application.