Security analysis of the diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Machine-assisted election auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Understanding the security properties of ballot-based verification techniques
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Some consequences of paper fingerprinting for elections
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Weight, weight, don't tell me: using scales to select ballots for auditing
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On the security of election audits with low entropy randomness
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Software support for software-independent auditing
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
OpenScan: a fully transparent optical scan voting system
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
On the use of financial data as a random beacon
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Computational complexity and information asymmetry in election audits with low-entropy randomness
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using convex optimization
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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Generation of random numbers is a critical component of existing post-election auditing techniques. Recent work has largely discouraged the use of all pseudo-random number generators, including cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs), for this purpose, instead recommending the sole use of observable physical techniques. In particular, simple dice rolling has received a great deal of positive attention [4, 6, 9]. The typical justification for this recommendation is that those less comfortable with mathematics prefer a simple, observable technique. This paper takes a contrary view. Simple, observable techniques like dice rolling are not necessarily robust against sleight of hand and other forms of fraud, and attempts to harden them against fraud can dramatically increase their complexity. With simple dice rolling, we know of no techniques that provide citizens with a reasonable means of verifying that fraud did not occur during the roll process. CSPRNGs, used properly, can be simple, robust, and verifiable, and they allow for the use of auditing techniques that might otherwise be impractical. While we understand initial skepticism towards this option, we argue that appropriate use of CSPRNGs would strengthen audit security.