Computational complexity and information asymmetry in election audits with low-entropy randomness

  • Authors:
  • Nadia Heninger

  • Affiliations:
  • Princeton University

  • Venue:
  • EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We investigate the security of an election audit using a table of random numbers prepared in advance. We show how this scenario can be modeled using tools from combinatorial graph theory and computational complexity theory, and obtain the following results: (1) A randomly generated table can be used to produce a statistically good election audit that requires less randomness to be generated in real time by the auditors. (2) It is likely to be computationally infeasible for an adversary to compute, given a pre-prepared table of random numbers, how to minimize their chances of detection in an audit. (3) It is computationally infeasible to distinguish a truly random table from a malicious table that has been modified to decrease the probability of detecting cheating in certain precincts.