Randomized algorithms
On the Unique Games Conjecture
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
In defense of pseudorandom sample selection
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Public-key cryptography from different assumptions
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Detecting high log-densities: an O(n¼) approximation for densest k-subgraph
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Graph expansion and the unique games conjecture
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the security of election audits with low entropy randomness
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using convex optimization
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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We investigate the security of an election audit using a table of random numbers prepared in advance. We show how this scenario can be modeled using tools from combinatorial graph theory and computational complexity theory, and obtain the following results: (1) A randomly generated table can be used to produce a statistically good election audit that requires less randomness to be generated in real time by the auditors. (2) It is likely to be computationally infeasible for an adversary to compute, given a pre-prepared table of random numbers, how to minimize their chances of detection in an audit. (3) It is computationally infeasible to distinguish a truly random table from a malicious table that has been modified to decrease the probability of detecting cheating in certain precincts.