Print signatures for document authentication
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy issues in an electronic voting machine
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
On estimating the size and confidence of a statistical audit
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Machine-assisted election auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
On auditing elections when precincts have different sizes
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
In defense of pseudorandom sample selection
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Fingerprinting Blank Paper Using Commodity Scanners
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SOBA: secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audit
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Bubble trouble: off-line de-anonymization of bubble forms
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
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Recent research has demonstrated that individual pieces of paper can be fingerprinted and reidentified later at low cost, using commodity scanners. We consider the consequences of this fact for electronic voting. The most obvious consequence is negative: the ability to fingerprint paper endangers the secrecy of ballots in any system that keeps paper records of individual ballots, including standard optical scan and DRE-VVPAT systems. We characterize the resulting risks and discuss when and how they can be mitigated. Less obviously, the ability to fingerprint paper can also have positive consequences, by enabling certain new kinds of post-election audit procedures, both to compare electronic records to the corresponding paper records and to detect the use of forged ballot stock. Paper reidentification presents new challenges for election officials, but careful consideration of its implications now may allow us to preserve ballot secrecy and strengthen election integrity.