Cryptographic voting protocols: a systems perspective
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Extending prerendered-interface voting software to support accessibility and other ballot features
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Pre-election testing and post-election audit of optical scan voting terminal memory cards
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
State-wide elections, optical scan voting systems, and the pursuit of integrity
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Software on the witness stand: what should it take for us to trust it?
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
Determining the causes of AccuVote optical scan voting terminal memory card failures
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Towards Trustworthy Elections
A secure architecture for voting electronically (SAVE)
Towards Trustworthy Elections
A threat analysis of prêt à voter
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Definition and analysis of election processes
SPW/ProSim'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Software Process Simulation and Modeling
The bug that made me president a browser- and web-security case study on helios voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Malicious takeover of voting systems: arbitrary code execution on optical scan voting terminals
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
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In a quest for election legitimacy, officials are increasingly deploying direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems. A project to assess their trustworthiness revealed both the ease of introducing bugs into such systems and the difficulty of detecting them during audits.