Communications of the ACM - Voting systems
Communications of the ACM - Bioinformatics
An authentication and Ballot layout attack against an optical scan voting terminal
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Hack-a-Vote: Security Issues with Electronic Voting Systems
IEEE Security and Privacy
Pre-election testing and post-election audit of optical scan voting terminal memory cards
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
Taking total control of voting systems: firmware manipulations on an optical scan voting terminal
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
Determining the causes of AccuVote optical scan voting terminal memory card failures
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Modeling and analyzing faults to improve election process robustness
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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In recent years, two distinct electronic voting technologies have been introduced and extensively utilized in election procedures: direct recording electronic systems and optical scan (OS) systems. The latter are typically deemed safer, as they inherently provide a voter-verifiable paper trail that enables hand-counted audits and recounts that rely on direct voter input. For this reason, OS machines have been widely deployed in the United States. Despite the growing popularity of these machines, they are known to suffer from various security vulnerabilities that, if left unchecked, can compromise the integrity of elections in which the machines are used. This article studies general auditing procedures designed to enhance the integrity of elections conducted with optical scan equipment and, additionally, describes the specific auditing procedures currently in place in the State of Connecticut. We present an abstract view of a typical OS voting technology and its relationship to the general election process. With this in place, we lay down a "temporal-resource" adversarial model, providing a simple language for describing the disruptive power of a potential adversary. Finally, we identify how audit procedures, injected at various critical stages before, during, and after an election, can frustrate such adversarial interference and so contribute to election integrity.We present the implementation of such auditing procedures for elections in the State of Connecticut utilizing the Premiere (Diebold) AccuVote OS; these audits were conducted by the UConn VoTeR Center, at the University of Connecticut, on request of the Office of the Secretary of the State. We discuss the effectiveness of such procedures in every stage of the process and we present results and observations gathered from the analysis of past election data.