A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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The term "end-to-end verifiability" has been used over the past several years to describe multiple voting system proposals. The term has, however, never been formally defined. As a result, its meaning tends to change from voting system to voting system. We propose a definition for end-to-end verifiability of public elections based on performance requirements, as opposed to design requirements. We suggest a set of properties that collectively define the term. The properties help detect some of the possible problems that may influence the integrity of the election outcome.