Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
According to international law, anonymity of the voter is a fundamental precondition for democratic elections. In electronic voting, several aspects of voter anonymity have been identified. In this paper, we re-examine anonymity with respect to voting, and generalise existing notions of anonymity in e-voting. First, we identify and categorise the types of attack that can be a threat to anonymity of the voter, including different types of vote buying and coercion. This analysis leads to a categorisation of anonymity in voting in terms of a) the strength of the anonymity achieved and b) the extent of interaction between voter and attacker. Some of the combinations, including weak and strong receipt-freeness, are formalised in epistemic logic.