Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Single layer optical-scan voting with fully distributed trust
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
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In many end-to-end voting systems there is a single entity that produces each ballot. This entity can be the printer in the case of paper ballots, or the voting machine in the case of an electronic interface. While not able to change election results, this powerful entity has access to confidential information and can reveal selections made by the voters which, along with the voter's identities, can compromise the secrecy of the ballot. We propose ClearVote, a new end-to-end voting system that has no single entity that can reveal ballot selections. The ClearVote ballot has three sheets of transparent plastic, each sheet coming from a different printer. Assuming no two printers collude, there is no single entity with enough knowledge to reveal ballot selections.