The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
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This paper presents a method for adding end-to-end verifiability to any optical-scan vote counting system. A serial number and set of letters, paired with every candidate, are printed on each optical-scan ballot. The letter printed next to the candidate(s) chosen by the voter is posted to a bulletin board, and these letters are used as input to Punchscan's verifiable tallying method. The letters do not reveal which candidate was chosen by the voter. The method can be used as an independent verification mechanism that provides assurance that each vote is included in the final tally unmodified—a property not guaranteed by a manual recount. We also provide a proof-of-concept process that allows the election authority to settle disputes after the polls close while preserving ballot secrecy.