A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Almost entirely correct mixing with applications to voting
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An Efficient Scheme for Proving a Shuffle
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
EVT'06 Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop
Ballot casting assurance via voter-initiated poll station auditing
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
An implementation of a universally verifiable electronic voting scheme based on shuffling
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed el gamal encryption
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Privacy-supporting cloud computing by in-browser key translation
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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Individual verifiability is the ability of an electronic voting system to convince a voter that his vote has been correctly counted in the tally. Unfortunately, in most electronic voting systems the proofs for individual verifiability are non-intuitive and, moreover, need trusted devices to be checked. Based on the remote voting system JCJ/Civitas, we propose Trivitas, a protocol that achieves direct and end-to-end individual verifiability, while at the same time preserving coercion-resistance. Our technical contributions rely on two main ideas, both related to the notion of credentials already present in JCJ/Civitas. Firstly, we propose the use of trial credentials, as a way to track and audit the handling of a ballot from one end of the election system to the other end, without increased complexity on the voter end. Secondly, due to indistinguishability of credentials from random values, we observe that the association between any credential and its corresponding vote can be made public at the end of the election process, without compromising coercion-resistance. The voter has more intuitive and direct evidence that her intended vote has not been changed and will be counted in the final tally.