Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
IEEE Security and Privacy
Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification
EVT/WOTE'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
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This article presents an ‘end-to-end' integrity verification mechanism for use in minimally equipped secret paper-ballot election environments. The scheme presented in this paper achieves high integrity properties without interfering with the traditional marking and tabulation procedures of paper-ballot elections. Officials and auditors can respectively generate and independently verify ‘end-to-end' audit trails, with office stationery and entirely without cryptographic or mathematic computations.