The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A secure electronic voting protocol with IC cards
Journal of Systems and Software
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity
Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
An unlinkably divisible and intention attachable ticket scheme for runoff elections
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Provably Secure Partially Blind Signatures
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security of Blind Digital Signatures (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
A Multi-Recastable Ticket Scheme for Electronic Elections
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Provably Secure Blind Signature Schemes
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Receipt-Freeness in Large-Scale Elections without Untappable Channels
I3E '01 Proceedings of the IFIP Conference on Towards The E-Society: E-Commerce, E-Business, E-Government
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Blind Signature Scheme for Information Hiding
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Three voting protocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and twin
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Security proofs for signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A secure and practical electronic voting scheme
Computer Communications
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity
ICISS '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
Provably secure randomized blind signature scheme based on bilinear pairing
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
| Hi-index | 0.98 |
Despite well-known controversies surrounding electronic voting (e-voting), electronic voting systems are gradually replacing traditional paper-based ones in some developed countries. An anonymous e-voting system that can be used in elections with large electorates must meet various security requirements, such as anonymity, uncoercibility, tally correctness, completeness, unrecastability, verifiability, soundness, and honesty. In particular, the uncoercibility requirement is essential, since systems meeting this requirement can largely reduce the possibility of coercion and bribery in elections. If a voter obtains only one voting receipt in an electronic voting system, coercers or bribers can enforce the voter to show her/his voting receipt to identify whether the enforced voter followed their will or not. However, if a voter can obtain multiple receipts reflecting several possible intentions in an election, coercers cannot distinguish these receipts to decide how the voter actually voted. In this article, we analyze possible venues for successful coercion, and present ideas for developing an effective electronic voting protocol, allowing one to greatly reduce the chances of coercibility. This protocol is independent of the underlying cryptographic components, and it can be easily implemented in electronic voting systems. We use random oracle models to demonstrate that the proposed protocol possesses the necessary security features.