Security proofs for signature schemes

  • Authors:
  • David Pointcheval;Jacques Stern

  • Affiliations:
  • École Normale Supérieure, Laboratoire d'informatique, Paris;École Normale Supérieure, Laboratoire d'informatique, Paris

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
  • Year:
  • 1996

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper, we address the question of providing security proofs for signature schemes in the so-called random oracle model [1]. In particular, we establish the generality of this technique against adaptively chosen message attacks. Our main application achieves such a security proof for a slight variant of the El Garrial signature schemc [4] where committed values are hashed together with the message. This is a rather surprising result since the original El Gamal is, as RSA [11], subject to existential forgery.