A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A new identification scheme based on syndrome decoding
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
A New \mathcal{NP}-Complete Problem and Public-Key Identification
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
An Efficient Identification Scheme Based on Permuted Kernels (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Designing Identification Schemes with Keys of Short Size
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Concrete Security Treatment of Signatures Derived from Identification
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Security proofs for signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A new identification scheme based on the perceptrons problem
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Improved zero-knowledge identification with lattices
ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
A zero-knowledge identification scheme based on the q-ary syndrome decoding problem
SAC'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Public-key identification schemes based on multivariate quadratic polynomials
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
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The well-known forking lemma by Pointcheval and Stern has been used to prove the security of the so-called generic signature schemes. These signature schemes are obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from three-pass identification schemes. A number of five-pass identification protocols have been proposed in the last few years. Extending the forking lemma and the Fiat-Shamir transform would allow to obtain new signature schemes since, unfortunately, these newly proposed schemes fall outside the original framework. In this paper, we provide an extension of the forking lemma in order to assess the security of what we call n-generic signature schemes. These include signature schemes that are derived from certain (2n+1)-pass identification schemes. We thus obtain a generic methodology for proving the security of a number of signature schemes derived from recently published five-pass identification protocols, and potentially for (2n+1)-pass identification schemes to come.