Forgery attacks on Kang et al.'s identity-based strong designated verifier signature scheme and its improvement with security proof

  • Authors:
  • Ji-Seon Lee;Jik Hyun Chang;Dong Hoon Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Information Management and Security CIST, Korea University, 1, 5-Ka, Anam-dong Sungbuk-ku, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Sogang University, 1, Sinsu-dong Mapo-ku, Seoul 121-742, Republic of Korea;Graduate School of Information Management and Security CIST, Korea University, 1, 5-Ka, Anam-dong Sungbuk-ku, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea

  • Venue:
  • Computers and Electrical Engineering
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Recently, Kang et al. proposed a new identity-based strong designated verifier signature scheme (ID-SDVS) and identity-based designated verifier proxy signature scheme (ID-DVPS). They claimed that their schemes are unforgeable. However, we found out that their schemes are universally forgeable in the sense that anyone can forge valid ID-SDVS and ID-DVPS on an arbitrary message without the knowledge of the secret key of either the signer or the designated verifier. Finally, we propose an improved ID-SDVS which is unforgeable. We give formal security proof of universal unforgeability of our scheme. We also give an improved ID-DVPS.