STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Payment systems and credential mechanisms with provable security against abuse by individuals
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
On blind signatures and perfect crimes
Computers and Security
Untraceable off-line cash in wallet with observers
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Digital signets: self-enforcing protection of digital information (preliminary version)
STOC '96 Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Revokable and versatile electronic money (extended abstract)
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Trustee-based tracing extensions to anonymous cash and the making of anonymous change
Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Digital Payment Systems with Passive Anonymity-Revoking Trustees
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Disposable Zero-Knowledge Authentications and Their Applications to Untraceable Electronic Cash
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
How To Break and Repair A "Provably Secure" Untraceable Payment System
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security of Blind Digital Signatures (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cost-Effective Payment Schemes with Privacy Regulation
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Anonymity Control in E-Cash Systems
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Unlinkable Serial Transactions
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
An Efficient Off-line Electronic Cash System Based On The Representation Problem.
An Efficient Off-line Electronic Cash System Based On The Representation Problem.
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Security proofs for signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Transferred cash grows in size
EUROCRYPT'92 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient Asymmetric Self-Enforcement Scheme with Public Traceability
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
On Anonymous Electronic Cash and Crime
ISW '99 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Information Security
Balancing accountability and privacy using e-cash (extended abstract)
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
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Anonymity features of electronic payment systems are important for protecting privacy in an electronic world. However, complete anonymity prevents monitoring financial transactions and following the money trail, which are important tools for fighting serious crimes. To solve these type of problems several "escrowed cash" systems, that allow a "Trustee" to trace electronic money, were suggested. In this paper we suggest a completely different approach to anonymity control based on the fact that law enforcement is mainly concerned with large anonymous electronic payments. We describe a payment system that effectively limits the amount of money a user can spend anonymously in a given time frame. To achieve this we describe a technique to make electronic money strongly non-transferable. Our payment system protects the privacy of the honest user who plays by the rules, while introducing significant hurdles for several criminal abuses of the system.