Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Key Agreement in Dynamic Peer Groups
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
A Secure Fault-Tolerant Conference-Key Agreement Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Corrections to "A Secure Fault-Tolerant Conference-Key Agreement Protocol"
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Robust generalized MQV key agreement protocol without using one-way hash functions
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Security proofs for signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Conference key distribution schemes for secure digital mobile communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Security weakness of Tseng's fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol
Journal of Systems and Software
An efficient fault-tolerant group key agreement protocol
Computer Communications
Generating random numbers in hostile environments
Security'08 Proceedings of the 16th International conference on Security protocols
An improved fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol with forward secrecy
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Recently, Tzeng proposed a provably secure and fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol. It requires only a constant number of rounds to establish a conference key among all honest participants. This article will show that Tzeng's protocol does not offer forward secrecy. We say that a conference-key agreement protocol offers forward secrecy if the long-term secret key of any participant is compromised and will not result in the compromise of the previously established conference keys. This property is important and has been included in most key agreement protocols and standards. In this paper, an improvement based on Tzeng's protocol is proposed and it achieves forward secrecy. Under the Diffie-Hellman decision problem assumption and the random oracle model, we show that the proposed protocol can withstand passive attacks and is secure against impersonator's attacks. The improved protocol requires a constant number of rounds to compute a conference key. The improved protocol provides fault-tolerance.