Information Processing Letters
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
A Secure Fault-Tolerant Conference-Key Agreement Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Computers
The Design of a Conference Key Distribution System
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Identity-Based Fault-Tolerant Conference Key Agreement
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
A communication-efficient and fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol with forward secrecy
Journal of Systems and Software
New multiparty authentication services and key agreement protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Conference key distribution schemes for secure digital mobile communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
An efficient fault-tolerant group key agreement protocol
Computer Communications
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A fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol establishes a shared key among participants of a conference even when some malicious participants disrupt key agreement processes. Recently, Tseng proposed a new fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol that only requires a constant message size and a small number of rounds. In this paper, we show that the Tseng's protocol cannot provide forward and backward confidentiality during a conference session for the proposed attack method. We also show that a simple countermeasure-re-randomizing short-term keys of some participants-to avoid the proposed attack can be broken by extending the proposed attack method.