Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security proofs for signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Certificateless public key encryption without pairing
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
On constructing certificateless cryptosystems from identity based encryption
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
General Certificateless Encryption and Timed-Release Encryption
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
RSA-Based Certificateless Public Key Encryption
ISPEC '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Further Observations on Certificateless Public Key Encryption
Information Security and Cryptology
A brief introduction to certificateless encryption schemes and their infrastructures
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Provably secure certificate-based signature scheme without pairings
Information Sciences: an International Journal
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) has very appealing features, namely it does not require any public key certification (cf. traditional Public Key Cryptography) nor having key escrow problem (cf. Identity-Based Cryptography). However, it does suffer to the Denialof-Decryption (DoD) Attack called by Liu and Au [1], as its nature is similar to the well known Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack. Based on CLPKC, they introduced a new paradigm called Self-Generated-Certificate Public Key Cryptography (SGC-PKC) that captured the DoD Attack and proposed a first scheme derived from a novel application of Water's Identity-Based Encryption scheme. In this paper, we propose a new SGC-PKE scheme that does not depend on the bilinear pairings, which make it be more efficient and more short public keys than Liu and Au's scheme. More importantly, our scheme reaches Girault's trusted level 3 (cf. Girault's trusted level 2 of Liu and Au's scheme), the same level as is enjoyed in a traditional PKI.