Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters
PODC '86 Proceedings of the fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Perfect zero-knowledge in constant rounds
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application to Electronic
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Key Escrow System with Warrant Bounds
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Escrow Encryption Systems Visited: Attacks, Analysis and Designs
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Treshold Cryptosystems (invited talk)
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
"Indirect Discourse Proof": Achieving Efficient Fair Off-Line E-cash
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
FC '99 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Financial Cryptography
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Distributed Public Key Cryptosystems
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Chosen-Ciphertext Security for Any One-Way Cryptosystem
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Optimal-resilience proactive public-key cryptosystems
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing
SFCS '87 Proceedings of the 28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Publicly verifiable secret sharing
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Security proofs for signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Binding ElGamal: a fraud-detectable alternative to key-escrow proposals
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Round-optimal zero-knowledge arguments based on any one-way function
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
How to Publicly Verifiably Expand a Member without Changing Old Shares in a Secret Sharing Scheme
PAISI, PACCF and SOCO '08 Proceedings of the IEEE ISI 2008 PAISI, PACCF, and SOCO international workshops on Intelligence and Security Informatics
Two protocols for member revocation in secret sharing schemes
PAISI'11 Proceedings of the 6th Pacific Asia conference on Intelligence and security informatics
A simultaneous members enrollment and revocation protocol for secret sharing schemes
PAISI'12 Proceedings of the 2012 Pacific Asia conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics
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A Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS)sc heme allows a prover to verifiably prove that a value with specific properties is shared among a number of parties. This verification can be performed by anyone. Stadler introduced a PVSS for proving that the discrete log of an element is shared [S96], and based the PVSS on double-decker exponentiation. Schoenmakers recently presented a PVSS scheme that is as hard to break as deciding Diffie-Hellman (DDH)[Sc h99]. He further showed how a PVSS can be used to improve on a number of applications: fair electronic cash (with anonymity revocation), universally verifiable electronic voting, and software key escrow schemes. When the solution in [Sch99] is used for sharing a key corresponding to a given public key, the double-decker exponentiation method and specific assumptions are still required. Here we improve on [Sch99] and present a PVSS for sharing discrete logs that is as hard to break as the Discrete-Log problem itself, thus weakening the assumption of [Sch99]. Our solution differs in that it can be used directly to implement the sharing of private keys (avoiding the double decker methods). The scheme can therefore be implemented with any semantically secure encryption method (paying only by a moderate increase in proof length). A major property of our PVSS is that it provides an algebraic decoupling of the recovering participants (who can be simply represented by any set of public keys)from the sharing operation. Thus, our scheme diverts from the traditional polynomial-secret-sharing-based VSS. We call this concept Separable Shareholders.