Binding ElGamal: a fraud-detectable alternative to key-escrow proposals

  • Authors:
  • Eric R. Verheul;Henk C .A. Van Tilborg

  • Affiliations:
  • Ministry of the Interior, The Hague, The Netherlands;Department of Math. and Comp. Sc., Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
  • Year:
  • 1997

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We propose a concept for a worldwide information security infrastructure that protects law-abiding citizens, but not criminals, even if the latter use it fraudulently (i.e. when not complying with the agreed rules). It can be seen as a middle course between the inflexible but fraud-resistant KMI-proposal [8] and the flexible but non-fraud-resistant concept used in TIS-CKE [2]. Our concept consists of adding binding data to the latter concept, which will not prevent fraud by criminals but makes it P t least detectable by third parties without the need of any secret information. In [19], we depict a worldwide framework in which this concept could present a security tool that is flexible enough to be incorporated in any national cryptography policy, on both the domestic and foreign use of cryptography. Here, we present a construction for binding data for ElGamal type public key encryption schemes. As a side result we show that a particular simplification in a multiuser version of ElGamal does not affect its security.