Short ballot assumption and threeballot voting protocol

Authors:
Jacek Cichoń;Mirosław Kutyłowski;Bogdan Weglorz
Affiliations:
Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology
Venue:
SOFSEM'08 Proceedings of the 34th conference on Current trends in theory and practice of computer science
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We analyze the Threeballot voting system proposed recently by R. Rivest. We investigate the relation between the number of the candidates in a race and effectiveness of Strauss' attack. We also show that in a reasonable scenario it is impossible to reconstruct voters' preferences for a single race with two candidates.