On the effectiveness of k;-anonymity against traffic analysis and surveillance

Authors:
Nicholas Hopper;Eugene Y. Vasserman
Affiliations:
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
Venue:
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Year:
2006

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Abstract

The goal of most research on anonymity, including all currently used systems for anonymity, is to achieve anonymity through unlinkability: an adversary should not be able to determine the correspondence between the input and output messages of the system. An alternative anonymity goal is unobservability: an adversary should not be able to determine who sends and who receives messages. We study the effect of k-anonymity, a weak form of unobservability, on two types of attacks against systems that provide only unlinkability.