Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Freenet: a distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
The free haven project: distributed anonymous storage service
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A scalable content-addressable network
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Tangler: a censorship-resistant publishing system based on document entanglements
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet
A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Countering DoS attacks with stateless multipath overlays
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous routing in structured peer-to-peer overlays
Anonymous routing in structured peer-to-peer overlays
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant web publishing system
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Tapestry: a resilient global-scale overlay for service deployment
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A holistic anonymity framework for web services
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
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Location hidden services have received increasing attention as a means to resist censorship and protect the identity of service operators. Research and vulnerability analysis to date has mainly focused on how to locate the hidden service. But while the hiding techniques have improved, almost no progress has been made in increasing the resistance against DoS attacks directly or indirectly on hidden services. In this paper we suggest improvements that should be easy to adopt within the existing hidden service design, improvements that will both reduce vulnerability to DoS attacks and add QoS as a service option. In addition we show how to hide not just the location but the existence of the hidden service from everyone but the users knowing its service address. Not even the public directory servers will know how a private hidden service can be contacted, or know it exists.