The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine
WWW7 Proceedings of the seventh international conference on World Wide Web 7
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Internet Measurement Conference (formerly IMW - Internet Measurement Workshop)
Some findings on the network performance of broadband hosts
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
An empirical evaluation of wide-area internet bottlenecks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Vivaldi: a decentralized network coordinate system
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Veracity: a fully decentralized service for securing network coordinate systems
IPTPS'08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Many peer-to-peer systems require a way of accurately assessing the bandwidth of their constituent peers. However, nodes cannot be trusted to accurately report their own capacity in the presence of incentives to the contrary and thus self-reporting can lead to poor network performance and security flaws. We present EigenSpeed, a secure and accurate peer-to-peer bandwidth evaluation system based on opportunistic bandwidth measurements, combined using principal component analysis. We test EigenSpeed using data gathered from a real peer-to-peer system and show that it is efficient and accurate. We also show that it is resistant to attacks by colluding groups of malicious nodes.