Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Active Traffic Analysis Attacks and Countermeasures
ICCNMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 International Conference on Computer Networks and Mobile Computing
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
DSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Dependent link padding algorithms for low latency anonymity systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Synchronous batching: from cascades to free routes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
gPath: a game-theoretic path selection algorithm to protect Tor's anonymity
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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Low-latency anonymous communication protocols in general, and the popular onion-routing protocol in particular, are broken against simple timing attacks. While there have been few proposed solutions to this problem when the adversary is active, several padding schemes have been proposed to defend against a passive adversary that just observes timing patterns. Unfortunately active adversaries can break padding schemes by inserting delays and dropping messages. We present a protocol that provides anonymity against an active adversary by using a black-box padding scheme that is effective against a passive adversary. Our protocol reduces, in some sense, providing anonymous communication against active attacks to providing a padding scheme against passive attacks. Our analytical results show that anonymity can be made arbitrarily good at the cost of some added latency and required bandwidth. We also perform measurements on the Tor network to estimate the real-world performance of our protocol, showing that the added delay is not excessive.