Self-similarity in World Wide Web traffic: evidence and possible causes
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Expected Length of the Longest Probe Sequence in Hash Code Searching
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
On Effectiveness of Link Padding for Statistical Traffic Analysis Attacks
ICDCS '03 Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
The power of two choices in randomized load balancing
The power of two choices in randomized load balancing
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous Networking with Minimum Latency in Multihop Networks
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
The traffic analysis of continuous-time mixes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Anonymous Networking Amidst Eavesdroppers
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Preventing active timing attacks in low-latency anonymous communication
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Impact of network topology on anonymity and overhead in low-latency anonymity networks
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Exposing invisible timing-based traffic watermarks with BACKLIT
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Efficient web browsing with perfect anonymity using page prefetching
ICA3PP'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing - Volume Part I
Privacy in mobile technology for personal healthcare
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Low latency anonymity systems are susceptive to traffic analysis attacks. In this paper, we propose a dependent link padding scheme to protect anonymity systems from traffic analysis attacks while providing a strict delay bound. The covering traffic generated by our scheme uses the minimum sending rate to provide full anonymity for a given set of flows. The relationship between user anonymity and the minimum covering traffic rate is then studied via analysis and simulation. When user flows are Poisson processes with the same sending rate, the minimum covering traffic rate to provide full anonymity to m users is O(log m). For Pareto traffic, we show that the rate of the covering traffic converges to a constant when the number of flows goes to infinity. Finally, we use real Internet trace files to study the behavior of our algorithm when user flows have different rates.