Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Privacy preservation services: challenges and solutions
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Low-latency Mix Using Split and Merge Operations
Journal of Network and Systems Management
Low latency anonymity with mix rings
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Reasoning about the anonymity provided by pool mixes that generate dummy traffic
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Synchronous batching: from cascades to free routes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On blending attacks for mixes with memory
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
Blending different latency traffic with alpha-mixing
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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A dummy traffic strategy is described that can be implemented by mix nodes in an anonymous communication network to detect and counter active (n - 1) attacks and their variants. Heartbeat messages are sent anonymously from the mix node back to itself in order to establish its state of connectivity with the rest of the network. In case the mix is under attack, the flow of heartbeat messages is interrupted and the mix takes measures to preserve the quality of the anonymity it provides by introducing decoy messages.