Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Heartbeat traffic to counter (n-1) attacks: red-green-black mixes
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Reasoning about the anonymity provided by pool mixes that generate dummy traffic
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A fresh look at the generalised mix framework
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Beyond TOR: the truenyms protocol
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
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Blending attacks are a general class of traffic-based attacks, exemplified by the (n–1)-attack. Adding memory or pools to mixes mitigates against such attacks, however there are few known quantitative results concerning the effect of pools on blending attacks. In this paper we give a precise analysis of the number of rounds required to perform an (n–1)-attack on the pool mix, timed pool mix, timed dynamic pool mix and the binomial mix.