Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
On blending attacks for mixes with memory
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
An HMM Approach to Anonymity Analysis of Continuous Mixes
Advanced Web and NetworkTechnologies, and Applications
Disappearing Cryptography: Information Hiding: Steganography & Watermarking
Disappearing Cryptography: Information Hiding: Steganography & Watermarking
Privacy policy enforcement for ambient ubiquitous services
AmI'10 Proceedings of the First international joint conference on Ambient intelligence
Pool-based anonymous communication framework for high-performance computing
The Journal of Supercomputing
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Anonymity systems designed to handle anonymous email have been implemented with a variety of different mixes. Although many of their properties have been analysed in previous work, some are still not well understood and many results are still missing. In this paper we reexamine the generalised mix framework and the binomial mix of [7]. We show that under some parameterizations the binomial mix has undesirable properties. More specifically, for any constant parameterization of the binomial mix, there is a minimum number of messages beyond which it acts as a timed mix. In this case the number of messages inside it is no longer hidden from the adversary and the mix is vulnerable to easy active attack. We suggest ways to avoid this in the generalised mix framework. Secondly, we show that the binomial distribution used in the framework produces distribution of pool sizes with low variance and show how to improve on this. Finally, we present a technique from queueing theory which allows us to analyse this property for a class of mixes assuming Poisson message arrivals.