Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
EUC '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing - Volume 02
XPROB - A Generalized Pool-Based Anonymous Communication Framework
IIH-MSP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Fifth International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A fresh look at the generalised mix framework
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Reasoning about the anonymity provided by pool mixes that generate dummy traffic
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Real-time mixes: a bandwidth-efficient anonymity protocol
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We propose and analyze in details the revised model of XPROB, an infinite family of pool-based anonymous communication systems that can be used in various applications including high performance computing environments. XPROB overcomes the limitations of APROB Channel that only resists a global delaying adversary (GDA). Each instance of XPROB uses a pool mix as its core component to provide resistance against a global active adversary (GAA), a stronger yet more practical opponent than a GDA. For XPROB, a GAA can drop messages from users but cannot break the anonymity of the senders of messages. Analysis and experimental evaluations show that each instance of XPROB provides greater anonymity than APROB Channel for the same traffic load and user behaviors (rate and number of messages sent). In XPROB, any message can be delivered with high probability within a few rounds after its arrival into the system; thus, an opponent cannot be certain when a message will be delivered. Furthermore, users can choose their own preference balance between anonymity and delay. Through the evaluation, we prove that XPROB can provide anonymity for users in high-performance computing environments.