Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
An Architecture for an Anonymity Network
WETICE '01 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Breaking the collusion detection mechanism of morphmix
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PPINA – a forensic investigation protocol for privacy enhancing technologies
CMS'06 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Optimal tag suppression for privacy protection in the semantic Web
Data & Knowledge Engineering
A collaborative protocol for anonymous reporting in vehicular ad hoc networks
Computer Standards & Interfaces
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Designing mix-networks for low-latency applicationsthat offer acceptable performance and provide good resistanceagainst attacks without introducing too much over-headis very difficult. Good performance and small over-headsare vital to attract users and to be able to supportmany of them, because with only a few users, there is noanonymity at all. In this paper, we analyze how well differentkinds of mix-networks are suited to provide practicalanonymity for a very large number of users.