Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Kademlia: A Peer-to-Peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
The impact of DHT routing geometry on resilience and proximity
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions
Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions
TAP: A Novel Tunneling Approach for Anonymity in Structured P2P Systems
ICPP '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Parallel Processing
AP3: cooperative, decentralized anonymous communication
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Defending against eclipse attacks on overlay networks
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cashmere: resilient anonymous routing
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable onion routing with torsk
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hashing it out in public: common failure modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
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In this paper, we examine the ShadowWalker peer-to-peer anonymity scheme. ShadowWalker attempts to provide anonymity via circuits built using random walks over a secured topology. ShadowWalker's topology is secured through the use of shadows, peers that certify another node's routing information. We demonstrate two flaws in ShadowWalker. First, an attacker can compromise the underlying topology of ShadowWalker as a result of an insufficient numbers of shadows. We show that the failure of the underlying topology directly results in the failure of ShadowWalker to provide anonymity guarantees. Second, the dependence on untrusted nodes to certify other nodes allows an attacker to launch a selective denial of service attack. We show that there is an inherent tension between protecting against these two attacks: weakening the first attack strengthens the second attack and vice versa. We introduce a mechanism that generalizes ShadowWalker's lookup defense, and show that this mechanism can be tuned to simultaneously provide strong protection against both these attacks. Last, we implement ShadowWalker and provide performance measurements from a prototype deployment on PlanetLab.