The design, implementation and operation of an email pseudonym server
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Network traffic tracking systems: folly in the large?
Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms
The free haven project: distributed anonymous storage service
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
An Equitably Fair On-line Auction Scheme
EC-WEB '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies
Anonymous Authentication of Membership in Dynamic Groups
FC '99 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Group Principals and the Formalization of Anonymity
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
Linkability in Practical Electronic Cash Design
ISW '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Security
Practical server privacy with secure coprocessors
IBM Systems Journal - End-to-end security
Community support and identity management
ECSCW'01 Proceedings of the seventh conference on European Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work
Formalized Information-Theoretic Proofs of Privacy Using the HOL4 Theorem-Prover
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
IT-security and privacy: design and use of privacy-enhancing security mechanisms
IT-security and privacy: design and use of privacy-enhancing security mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Privacy enhanced technologies: methods – markets – misuse
TrustBus'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trust, Privacy, and Security in Digital Business
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In this announcement we introduce a system called Crowds for protecting users'' anonymity on the world-wide-web. Crowds, named for the notion of ``blending into a crowd'''', operates by grouping users into a large and geographically diverse group (crowd) that collectively issues requests on behalf of its members. Web servers are unable to learn the true source of a request because it is equally likely to have originated from any member of the crowd, and indeed collaborating crowd members cannot distinguish the originator of a request from a member who is merely forwarding the request on behalf of another. Our security analysis introduces {\em degrees of anonymity} as an important tool for describing and proving anonymity properties.