An Equitably Fair On-line Auction Scheme

  • Authors:
  • Emmanouil Magkos;Mike Burmester;Vassilios Chrissikopoulos

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-

  • Venue:
  • EC-WEB '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies
  • Year:
  • 2000

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Abstract

We present a sealed-bid electronic auction scheme that is equitably fair for the bidders and the seller. In this scheme, the interests of both the bidders and the seller are safeguarded: the identity of the non-winning bidders and their bidding behavior are protected (anonymity), and the bidders cannot withdraw their bids without being detected (non-repudiation). The scheme fulfills the requirements of a secure auction scheme and is verifiable. It extends the Stubblebine & Syverson auction scheme that is not equitably fair (it does not prevent bid withdrawals). Our scheme employs a Registar and an Auctioneer for which no special trust assumptions are made.