The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Anonymous Web transactions with Crowds
Communications of the ACM
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
A protocol for anonymous communication over the Internet
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Xor-trees for efficient anonymous multicast and reception
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Introducing Tarzan, a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
P5: A Protocol for Scalable Anonymous Communication
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Rumor Riding: Anonymizing Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Systems
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Low latency anonymity with mix rings
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Protect the identity of participants may be advantageous or essential and even critical for many internet applications. Mix rings architecture give better performance than mix-nets while maintaining anonymity that is stronger than onion routing. This paper presents an enhancement of mix rings, which is a hybrid P2P system and is designed to provide anonymity under a strong adversarial model in terms of identification, anonymity and resilience to collusion, along with low latency of data delivery and the link utilization. We use a double-layer overlay network, composed of nodes that are interested in anonymity and trusted index nodes and introduce several cluster escape and random extend mechanisms into mix rings. We present a description of the protocol, an analysis of common attack defense, and evaluate the degree of anonymity using MATLAB simulations.