Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Does additional information always reduce anonymity?
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PriMan: a privacy-preserving identity framework
DBSec'10 Proceedings of the 24th annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security and privacy
AOS: an anonymous overlay system for mobile ad hoc networks
Wireless Networks
The dangers of composing anonymous channels
IH'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding
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We present a traffic analysis of the ADU anonymity scheme presented at ESORICS 2008, and the related RADU scheme. We show that optimal attacks are able to de-anonymize messages more effectively than believed before. Our analysis applies to single messages as well as long term observations using multiple messages. The search of a "better" scheme is bound to fail, since we prove that the original Crowds anonymity system provides the best security for any given mean messaging latency. Finally we present D-Crowds, a scheme that supports any path length distribution, while leaking the least possible information, and quantify the optimal attacks against it.