STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Demonstrating possession of a discrete logarithm without revealing it
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
The round complexity of secure protocols
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
On 2-Round Secure Multiparty Computation
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved protocol for demonstrating possession of discrete logarithms and some generalizations
EUROCRYPT'87 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed el gamal encryption
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
GLP: A cryptographic approach for group location privacy
Computer Communications
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The Dining Cryptographers problem studies how to securely compute the boolean-OR function while preserving the privacy of each input bit. Since its first introduction by Chaum in 1988, it has attracted a number of solutions over the past twenty years. In this paper, we propose an exceptionally efficient solution: Anonymous Veto Network (or AV-net). Our protocol is provably secure under the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and random oracle assumptions, and is better than past work in the following ways. It provides the strongest protection of each input's privacy against collusion attacks; it requires only two rounds of broadcast, fewer than any other solution; the computational load and bandwidth usage are the least among the available techniques; and the efficiency of our protocol is achieved without relying on any private channels or trusted third parties. Overall, the efficiency of our protocol seems as good as one may hope for.