The design philosophy of the DARPA internet protocols
SIGCOMM '88 Symposium proceedings on Communications architectures and protocols
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Fingerprinting websites using traffic analysis
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
RequestPolicy: Increasing Web Browsing Privacy through Control of Cross-Site Requests
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
A potential HTTP-based application-level attack against Tor
Future Generation Computer Systems
One bad apple spoils the bunch: exploiting P2P applications to trace and profile Tor users
LEET'11 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats
Website fingerprinting in onion routing based anonymization networks
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor HTTP usage and information leakage
CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Breaking Tor anonymity with game theory and data mining
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Dissent in numbers: making strong anonymity scale
OSDI'12 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
How to block Tor's hidden bridges: detecting methods and countermeasures
The Journal of Supercomputing
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This paper describes a new attack on the anonymity of web browsing with Tor. The attack tricks a user's web browser into sending a distinctive signal over the Tor network that can be detected using traffic analysis. It is delivered by a malicious exit node using a man-in-the-middle attack on HTTP. Both the attack and the traffic analysis can be performed by an adversary with limited resources. While the attack can only succeed if the attacker controls one of the victim's entry guards, the method reduces the time required for a traffic analysis attack on Tor from O(nk) to O(n + k), where n is the number of exit nodes and k is the number of entry guards. This paper presents techniques that exploit the Tor exit policy system to greatly simplify the traffic analysis. The fundamental vulnerability exposed by this paper is not specific to Tor but rather to the problem of anonymous web browsing itself. This paper also describes a related attack on users who toggle the use of Tor with the popular Firefox extension Torbutton.