Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Efficient string matching: an aid to bibliographic search
Communications of the ACM
Location Privacy in Pervasive Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Web Privacy with P3p
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Wireless mobile applications and services on WLAN hotspots
Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Peripheral privacy notifications for wireless networks
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
The windows of pivate DNS updates
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Scanning electronic documents for personally identifiable information
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Privacy management for secure mobility
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Preserving location privacy in wireless lans
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Understanding data lifetime via whole system simulation
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Passive data link layer 802.11 wireless device driver fingerprinting
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Can Ferris Bueller still have his day off? protecting privacy in the wireless era
HOTOS'07 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX workshop on Hot topics in operating systems
Devices that tell on you: privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Proximity breeds danger: emerging threats in metro-area wireless networks
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Identity trail: covert surveillance using DNS
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Tightlip: keeping applications from spilling the beans
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
Physical Layer Attacks on Unlinkability in Wireless LANs
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Mobile computer users often have a false sense of anonymity when they connect to the Internet at cafes, hotels, airports or other public places. In this paper, we analyze information leaked by mobile computers to the local access link when they are outside their home domain. While most application data can be encrypted, there is no similar protection for signaling messages in the lower layers of the protocol stack. We found that all layers of the protocol stack leak various plaintext identifiers of the user, the computer and their affiliations to the local link, which a casual attacker can observe. This violates the user's sense of privacy and may make the user or computer vulnerable to further attacks. It is, however, not possible to disable the offending protocols because many of them are critical to the mobile user experience. We argue that the most promising solutions to the information leaks are to filter outbound data, in particular name resolution requests, and to disable unnecessary service discovery depending on the network location. This is because most information leaks result from failed attempts by roaming computers to connect to services that are not available in the current access network.