A survey of intrusion detection techniques
Computers and Security
A taxonomy of computer program security flaws
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Secure Execution of Java Applets Using a Remote Playground
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Intrusion confinement by isolation in information systems
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on database security
Using information security as a response to competitor analysis systems
Communications of the ACM
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Code red worm propagation modeling and analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Constructing attack scenarios through correlation of intrusion alerts
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Sustaining Availability of Web Services under Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Aggregation and Correlation of Intrusion-Detection Alerts
RAID '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
A Different Look at Secure Distributed Computation
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Alert Correlation in a Cooperative Intrusion Detection Framework
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defending Against Denial-of-Service Attacks with Puzzle Auctions
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Trend Analysis of Exploitations
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Information Assurance: Dependability and Security in Networked Systems
Information Assurance: Dependability and Security in Networked Systems
Cooperative Security Schemes for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
CDVE '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cooperative Design, Visualization, and Engineering
Cloaking games in location based services
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM workshop on Secure web services
Stimulating cooperation in self-organized vehicular networks
APCC'09 Proceedings of the 15th Asia-Pacific conference on Communications
Reconfigurable peer-to-peer connectivity overlays for information assurance applications
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Towards a game theoretic authorisation model
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
Mapping between classical risk management and game theoretical approaches
CMS'11 Proceedings of the 12th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and multimedia security
Could firewall rules be public – a game theoretical perspective
Security and Communication Networks
Intended actions: risk is conflicting incentives
ISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security
Risk-Based models of attacker behavior in cybersecurity
SBP'13 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction
A stochastic model of attack process for the evaluation of security metrics
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Although the ability to model and infer Attacker Intent, Objectives and Strategies (AIOS) may dramatically advance the literature of risk assessment, harm prediction, and predictive or proactive cyber defense, existing AIOS inference techniques are ad hoc and system or application specific. In this paper, we present a general incentive-based method to model AIOS and a game theoretic approach to infer AIOS. On one hand, we found that the concept of incentives can unify a large variety of attacker intents; the concept of utilities can integrate incentives and costs in such a way that attacker objectives can be practically modeled. On the other hand, we developed a game theoretic AIOS formalization which can capture the inherent inter-dependency between AIOS and defender objectives and strategies in such a way that AIOS can be automatically inferred. Finally, we use a specific case study to show how AIOS can be inferred in real world attack-defense scenarios.