Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
Randomized mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there is evidence that no polynomial-time truthful deterministic mechanism provides an approximation ratio better than 2. We also show for the first time that truthful in expectation polynomial-time mechanisms are provably stronger than polynomial-time universally truthful mechanisms. Specifically, we show that there is a setting in which: (1) there is a non-polynomial time truthful mechanism that always outputs the optimal solution, and that (2) no universally truthful randomized mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2 in polynomial time, but (3) an FPTAS that is truthful in expectation exists.