Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting

Authors:
Xiaotie Deng;Qi Qi
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, P.R. China;Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, USA
Venue:
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2009

Citing 2
Cited 0

Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)

STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents

FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We develop an auction system that determines a fair number of komi for holding black stones in a GO game between two players of equal strength, and hence the right to the first move. It is modeled as a priority right pricing problem that demands for budget-balanced and egalitarian conditions, where a negative utility is associated with the losers. We establish results involved with the incentive compatible properties for this problem under both deterministic and randomized protocols.