Combinatorial auction across independent markets [Extended Abstract]

Authors:
Ning Chen;Xiaotie Deng;Hong Zhu
Affiliations:
Fudan University, P. R. China;City University of Hong Kong;Fudan University, P. R. China
Venue:
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2003

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Abstract

In this paper, we study several issues involved in combinatorial auction across independent markets for individual goods. (i) We establish the complexity for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium of combinatorial auction. (ii) We consider incentive compatible mechanism that prices individual goods of single-minded auction, and improving the previous work on pricing bundles [7].