Design diffserv multicast with selfish agents

Authors:
WeiZhao Wang;Xiang-Yang Li;Zheng Sun
Affiliations:
Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL;Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL;Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Venue:
AAIM'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Algorithmic Applications in Management
Year:
2005

Citing 7
Cited 0

Modeling and heuristic worst-case performance analysis of the two-level network design problem

Management Science
Improved Steiner tree approximation in graphs

SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for the Grade of Service Steiner Minimum Tree Problem

Journal of Global Optimization
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract

Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks

Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework

Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Video distribution on multicast networks

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when the participants (i.e., relay links) are selfish. We assume that each link ei is associated with a cost coefficient ai such that the cost of ei to provide a multicast service with bandwidth demand x is ai · x. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a truthful mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time 8-approximation algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomial-time computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link ei maximizes its profit when it reports its privately cost coefficient ai truthfully.